Domains of individual preferences for which the well-known impossibility theorems of Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite do not hold are studied. To comprehend the limitations these results imply for social choice rules, we search for the largest domains that are possible. Here, we restrict the domain of individual preferences of precisely one individual. It turns out that, for such domains, the conditions of inseparable pair and of inseparable set yield the only maximal domains on which there exist non-dictatorial, Pareto-e¢ cient and strategy-proof social choice rules. Next, we characterize the maximal domains which allow for Maskin monotone, non-dictatorial and Pareto-e¢ cient social choice rules.
Introduction
The two most negative results on the decentralization of social choice functions are, respectively, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite (Gibbard (1973) , and Satterthwaite 1975) and the Muller-Satterthwaite (Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977) theorems. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that over an unrestricted domain of linear orderings-and with at least three alternativesany surjective and strategy-proof social choice function is dictatorial. On the other hand, the Muller-Satterthwaite theorem, by establishing the connections between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity, states that any unanimous and Maskin monotonic social choice function is dictatorial.
These two theorems have a damaging impact on decentralization. Strategyproofness and Maskin monotonicity are, respectively, necessary conditions for dominant strategy implementation and Nash implementation. If a planner restricts himself to institutions corresponding to normal game forms having a unique equilibrium at every preference pro…le, then only trivial social choice functions are decentralizable.
However, the two results strongly rely on the assumption of unrestricted domain of preferences. Restricted domains have delivered possibility results on strategy-proof and Maskin monotonic social choice functions. 1 For instance, if preferences are quasi-linear with respect to a numeraire good, then Clark-Groves mechanisms are strategy-proof. 2 If preferences are singlepeaked, then generalized median voting rules are strategy-proof (see e.g. Moulin, 1980) . Finally, in exchange or production economies, if the domain of preferences is such that there always exist a unique Walrasian equilibrium in the interior of the feasible set, then the Walrasian social choice function is Maskin monotonic and obviously non-dictatorial. 3 In this paper, we work with the abstract social choice model. We are interested in the maximal preference domains under which there exists social choice functions that escape the Gibbard-Satterthwaite and the Muller-Satterthwaite theorems. This question is not new, at least for the strategyproof case. In the literature, the approach that is usually followed is to take a possibility domain and to …nd the maximal enlargement of this domain so that the possibility result still holds. For instance, this is the case of Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1994) ; Barberà, Gul and Stacchetti (1994) ; Serizawa (1995); Serizawa and Ching (1998) ; or Masso and Neme (2001) . Each paper deals with entire restricted domain of preferences. Moreover, as far as we are aware of, there are no papers that deals with maximal domains for non-trivial Maskin monotonic social choice functions. Closely related but di¤erent questions were posed by Kalai and Muller (1978) and Kalai and Ritz (1980) . They studied the general conditions for domains which admit the existence of non-dictatorial Arrow-type social welfare functions.
Our approach is di¤erent. Instead of allowing that any agent's preference domain be restricted, we restrict the preference domain of precisely one agent. By doing so, we look for necessary and su¢ cient conditions that guarantee a possibility result. We identify two conditions that are both necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of non-trivial social choice functions. The social choice function K we identify is a hierarchical rule. In that sense, the rule is almost dictatorial. The conditions we identify are respectively strategy-proof admissibility and Maskin admissibility.
We then examine the maximality of this domain restrictions. We study, in turn, strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity since the conditions we obtain are di¤erent. For strategy-proofness, we …nd that a domain of preferences is a maximal possibility domain if and only the restricted set of preferences of agent 1 has one inseparable pair or one inseparable set. The notion of inseparable pair is well-known in relation with non-dictatorial Arrow-type welfare functions (see e.g. Kalai and Ritz, 1980) . Just to …x idea, let us brie ‡y discuss the notion of inseparable pair and inseparable set. We say that an agent has an inseparable pair if there exist two alternatives x and y such that whenever x is ranked best, then y is second-best. 4 Suppose for instance that a board of managers has two vacancies. Current members of the board are contemplating several candidates. Among those are b, a bossy individual, and w a wimp that is afraid of b. Then, an agent i could rank b at the top and w second because he expects w to be obedient and to copy b 0 s decisions-the power of b would then be increased. 5 Clearly, agent i has an inseparable pair (b; w).
An agent has an inseparable set if there exist a set of alternatives Bof cardinality at least equal to three-such that all preferences with a best alternative in B ranks the alternatives in B adjacent to each other (while the ranking of alternatives both within B and the complement of B can be reversed from one pro…le to another). 6 For instance, suppose that there are two parties, left and right, involved in an election where several positions have to be distributed (e.g. prime minister versus lower ranked ministers). 7 Agents have to vote for one of the two parties and have to rank candidates within each party according to the position they would like them to have. There, it is natural to assume that agents rank individuals from the same party adjacent to each other. Then, every agent has an inseparable set. 8 On the other hand, in order to escape the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, we only need one agent to satisfy the domain restriction imposed by inseparable pair or inseparable set.
The notion of inseparable set goes at least back to Storcken (1989) . It follows that, in case of precisely three alternatives, if one arbitrary chosen preference is no longer admissible for one arbitrary chosen agent-yielding an inseparable pair for this agent-then on this domain neither the negative result of Gibbard Satterthwaite nor that of Muller Satterthwaite can be deduced.
For Maskin monotonicity, the condition is more intricate and relies on the existence of disjoint subsets of the sets of alternative and the existence of an asymmetric and transitive relation on the set of alternatives. However, like in the case of the maximal strategy-proof possibility domains, the result spells out a characterization of maximal Maskin monotone possibility domains in terms of a set of pairs of alternatives on which the coalition of agents whom sets of preferences are not restricted are decisive
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we introduce the model and the necessary de…nitions useful for the paper. Section 3 presents su¢ cient conditions for the existence of possibility results, as well as some connections between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. Then, section 4 establishes that these su¢ cient conditions are also necessary. Section 5 characterizes the maximal domain for strategy-proof, e¢ cient and non-dictatorial social choice functions. Next, section 6 characterizes the maximal domain for Maskin monotonic, e¢ cient and non-dictatorial social choice functions. Finally, section 7 provides some concluding remarks. 6 Observe that if the cardinality of B is equal to 2, then we have in fact two inseparable pairs. 7 Thus, each party has several candidates. 8 Thus, the strategy-proof and Pareto-e¢ cient rules that one may identify there will be less hierarchical than the one we identify.
The model
There is a set of alternatives A = f1; :::; mg, with m > 3 and a set of agents N = f1; :::; ng with n > 2.
Agents are endowed with a preference relation R over elements of A that is (strongly) complete, anti-symmetric and transitive; that is a preference relation is a linear order over alternatives. Let L(A) denote the set of all these preferences and L N (A) be the set of possible preference pro…les. For each R 2 L(A) and each (x; y) 2 A (Anfxg), x::: = R means that x is the best alternative at R, :::x:::y::: = R means that x is strictly preferred to y at R, :::xy::: = R means that x is strictly preferred to y at R and there is no alternative in between; and …nally x:::y = R means that x is the best alternative and y is the worst alternative at R. Let L x (A) denote the set of linear orderings R such that x::: = R. 9 We introduce the following restriction on domain of preferences.
A social choice rule K is a function from L N to A. The set of pro…les L N is convex if for each agent i 2 N , the preference domain L i is convex. For coalitions M and pro…les p; q 2 L N , the preference pro…le p is said to be a M -deviation of a pro…le q if pj N M = qj N M . 9 We set L ; So, for all preferences R in L i , if the best alternative at R is in B, then B is preferred to (A B) at R. Note that this condition trivially holds for the empty set, any singleton set and the set A itself. Therefore these are excluded. Furthermore, if B consists of precisely two alternatives, then having an inseparable set means having two inseparable pairs, which explains why sets with cardinality 2 are excluded in the de…nition of inseparable set.
The notion of inseparable pair is well-known see e.g. Kalai and Ritz (1980) . Although there it is a slightly stronger condition. That is L i has an inseparable pair (x; y) if for all R 2 L i if :::x:::y::: = R, then :::xy::: = R. Here we only need this inseparability if x is top alternative, because the almost dictatorial rule depends mainly on the top alternatives of agent 1, the agent with the restricted preference set. A similar remark as for inseparable pair holds for inseparable set as de…ned in Storcken (1989).
The following conditions for choice rules are well-known. We just rephrase these using the notation at hand.
Non-dictatorship: The choice rule K is non-dictatorial if for each agent i 2 N , there is a pro…le p 2 L N such that K(p)::: 6 = p(i). Maskin monotonicity: The choice rule K is Maskin monotonic if for each p, q 2 L N , low(K(p); p(i)) low(K(p); q(i)) for each i 2 N implies that K(p) = K(q):
Strong positive association: The choice rule K is strongly positively associated if for each p; q 2 L(A) and each a 2 A, low(a; p(i)) low(a; q(i)) for each i 2 N and p(i)j A fag = q(i)j A fag implies that K(q) 2 fK(p); ag.
Decisiveness of coalitions appear also in our setting as a powerful tool to analyze the problem at hand.
. It appears that the rules which simultaneously satisfy Pareto-e¢ ciency, non-dictatorship and either strategy-proofness or Maskin monotonicity on the domains at hand are almost dictatorial.
Let I A $ D $ A A for some transitive relation D on A. De…ne by K D the hierarchical choice rule corresponding to D de…ned as follows: for every pro…le p such that p(1) 2 L 1 y , K D (p) = best(p(2)j up(y;D) ). Because of D being unequal to both I A and A A, it follows that K D is non-dictatorial. Transitivity of D imposes a kind of rationality which under Pareto-e¢ ciency 10 is implied by both Maskin-monotonicity and strategy-proofness. Next, we discuss conditions that D has to satisfy in order for K D to be a strategy-proof or Maskin monotonic social choice rule. We introduce the following de…nitions.
Strategy-proof admissibility: The pair (D;
10 But independent of the actual preference domain restriction of agent 1
Let strategy(D; L 1 ) stands for the strategy-proof admissibility of the pair (D; L 1 ).
Maskin admissibility: The pair (D; L 1 ) is Maskin admissible, notation
Let Maskin(D; L 1 ) stands for the Maskin admissibility of the pair (D; L 1 ).
Su¢ cient conditions, strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity
The following Lemma shows that the condition of strategy-proof admissibility and Maskin admissibility are su¢ cient to guarantee that K D is strategy-proof or Maskin-monotone respectively and therewith explains the names of these two requirements on D and L 1 .
Lemma 1 Consider the hierarchical choice rule K D : L N ! A, corresponding to D. Then 1. strategy(D; L 1 ) implies that K D is non-dictatorial, Pareto-e¢ cient and strategy-proof;
2. Maskin(D; L 1 ) implies that K D is non-dictatorial, Pareto-e¢ cient and Maskin-monotone.
Proof. Non-dictatorship follows in both cases because of I
To prove Pareto-e¢ ciency let p be a pro…le with p(1) 2 L 1 y . It is su¢ cient to prove that Pareto-e¢ ciency is satis…ed at this pro…le p. This is indeed the case whenever K D (p) = y. So, suppose that K D (p) = best(p(2)j up(y;D) ) and In order to prove (1), assume strategy(D; L 1 ). Furthermore, let p be as above and pro…le q an fig-deviation of p for some agent i with q(1) 2 L 1 z for some z 2 A. To the contrary suppose that :::K D (q):::K D (p)::: = p(i). By the de…nition of K D it follows that i 6 2. If i = 2, then p(1) = q(1). Consequently, y = z and K D (q) = best(q(2)j up(z;D) ) = best(q(2)j up(y;D) ). So, in that case K D (q) 2 up(y; D). Because K D (p) = best(p(2)j up(y;D) ), we obtain a contradiction with :::K D (q):::K D (p)::: = p(i). To conclude the proof of (1), let i = 1. Therefore, p(2) = q(2). Because of :::K D (q):::K D (p)::: = p(1) and strategy(D; L 1 ), it follows that K D (p) 2 up(K D (q); D). Thus, since D is transitive; we conclude that K D (p) 2 up(z; D). But then K D (q) = best(q(2)j up(z;D) ) = best(p(2)j up(z;D) ) and :::K D (q):::K D (p)::: = p(1) contradict each other. This proves strategy-proofness.
In order to prove (2), assume Maskin(D; L 1 ) and consider fig-deviations p and q as before with, in addition, low(K D (p); p(i)) low(K D (p); q(i)). It is su¢ cient to prove that K D (p) = K D (q).This obviously holds whenever i > 2. So suppose that i = 1. Since low(K D (p); p(1)) low(K D (p); q(1)), it follows that z 2 up(K D (p); p(1)). Maskin(D; L 1 ), or re ‡exivity of D, or z = y imply that (K D (p); z) 2 D and (z; y) 2 D. Furthermore, transitivity of D implies that up(z; D) up(y; D). But because K D (p) = best(p(2)j up(y;D) ), it follows that K D (p) = best(p(2)j up(y;D) ) = best(p(2)j up(z;D) ) = best(q(2)j up(z;D) ) = K D (q).
A domain L N is called a strategy-proof possibility domain if there exist choice rules K : L N ! A which are simultaneously non-dictatorial, strategyproof and Pareto-e¢ cient. Furthermore, it is called a maximal strategy-proof possibility domain if it is a strategy-proof possibility domain and there is no other strategy-proof possibility domain, say b
L N , such that L N $ b L N . Similarly we de…ne a Maskin-monotone possibility domain and a maximal Maskinmonotone possibility domain by replacing the condition of strategy-proofness by the condition of Maskin monotonicity in the two previous de…nitions.
Example 1 In case L 1 has an inseparable pair (y; x) or an inseparable set B, it follows straightforwardly that strategy(D; L 1 ), where D = f(x; y)g or D = B B respectively. So, the previous Lemma implies that in these situations, the hierarchical choice rule K D is non-dictatorial, Pareto-e¢ cient and strategy-proof. Thus, in that case, L N is a strategy-proof possibility domain.
The following results logically link several of the conditions de…ned above. 2. If K is strategy-proof, then it is Maskin monotonic and strongly positively associated;
3. If L N is convex, then strategy-proofness of K is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity of K, as well as to strong positive association of K.
Proof. (First part) Clearly intermediate strategy-proof ness implies strategyproofness. So, suppose K is strategy-proof. Furthermore, let p and q be S-deviations for some S N such that p(i) = R for some R 2 L(A). It is su¢ cient to prove that It is su¢ cient to prove that K(p) = K(q). By strategy-proofness, it follows that K(q) 2 low(K(p); p(i)) and K(p) 2 low(K(q); q(i)). Given our assumption, we have that K(q) 2 low(K(p); q(i)) and K(p) 2 low(K(q); q(i)). As q(i) is antisymmetric we have that K(p) = K(q).
In order to prove strong positive association, let p and q be fig-deviations in L N . Furthermore, let a 2 A be such that low(a; p(i)) low(a; q(i)) and p(i)j A fag = q(i)j A fag . It is su¢ cient to prove that K(q) 2 fa; K(p)g. Suppose that K(p) 6 = K(q). Then we have to prove that K(q) = a. By strategyproofness, it follows that :::K(p):::K(q)::: = p(i) and :::K(q):::K(p)::: = q(i). Because p(i)j A fag = q(i)j A fag and low(a; p(i)) low(a; q(i)), this can only hold if K(q) = a.
(Third part) Let p and q be two fig-deviations in L N . It is su¢ cient that both Maskin monotonicity and strong positive association imply that, K(q) 2 low(K(p); p(i)):
Because of convexity of L N there are R 0 ; R 1 ; R 2 ; :::; R k 2 L i such that R 0 = p(i), R k = q(i), R t R t+1 = f(x t ; y t ); (y t ; x t )g for some x t and y t in A, with x t 6 = y t , for all t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::; k 1g and :::y t :::x t ::: = R s for all t < s 6 k and :::x t :::y t ::: = R s for all 0 6 s 6 t. Now take pro…les r 0 ; r 1 ; r 2 ; :::; r k 2 L N , fig-deviation of p such that r t (i) = R t for all t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::; kg. Now if K(r t ) 6 = K(r t+1 ) for some t 2 f0; 1; 2; :::; k 1g, then Maskin monotonicity as well as strong positive association imply that K(r t ) = x t and K(r t+1 ) = y t . Hence K(r t+1 ) 2 low(K(r t ); p(i)). By transitivity, it follows that K(r k ) 2 low(K(r 0 ); p(i)). So, K(q) 2 low(K(p); p(i)) proving that K is strategy-proof.
Necessary conditions for strategy-proofness or Maskin-monotonicity
In the previous section, the conditions of strategy-proof admissibility and of Maskin admissibility appeared to be su¢ cient to guarantee the existence of choice rules on the restricted domain that are Pareto-e¢ cient, non-dictatorial and strategy-proof, or Maskin monotonic, respectively. Here we prove that these two conditions are in fact also necessary. For the rest of this section, let K be a Pareto-e¢ cient and non-dictatorial social choice rule. We will show that whenever K is strategy-proof or Maskin monotonic, then I A $ D K (N f1g) $ A A is transitive and that the pair (D K (N f1g); L 1 ) is respectively strategy-proof admissible or Maskin admissible.
To avoid needless repetitions, assume that K is at least Maskin monotonic. So, cases at which the social choice rule K is strategy-proof are spelled out explicitly in this section. 
Proof. (Proof of 1 ) Let q 2 L N such that q(1) = R and zy::: = q(i) for all i 2 N f1g. By Lemma 2 it is su¢ cient to prove that K(q) = z. Consider p and r, two (N f1g)-deviations of q, such that xzy::: = p(i) and zxy::: = r(i) for all i 2 N f1g. Because of (x; y) 2 D(N f1g), it follows that K(p) = x. Pareto-e¢ ciency implies that K(r) 2 fy; zg. If K(r) = y, then Maskin monotonicity would yield the contradiction that K(p) = y. Therefore, K(r) = z and Maskin monotonicity implies that K(q) = z.
(Proof of 2 ) Suppose K is strategy-proof and z::: = R 0 2 L 1 z 6 = ;. Let q 2 L N such that q(1) = R 0 and xz::: = q(i) for all i 2 N f1g. By Lemma 2, it is su¢ cient to prove that K(q) = x. Consider (N f1g)-deviations p of q, with p(1) = R. Because of (x; y) 2 D(N f1g), it follows that K(p) = x. Pareto-e¢ ciency implies that K(q) 2 fx; zg. Now considering p and q, it follows that K(q) = z would violate strategy-proofness. In consequence, K(q) = x.
(Proof of 3 ) Suppose R 0 2 L 1 z such that low(x; R) low(x; R 0 ). Let q 2 L N be such that q(1) = R 0 and xz::: = q(i) for all i 2 N f1g. By Lemma 2, it is su¢ cient to prove that K(q) = x. Consider (N f1g)-deviations p of q, with p(1) = R. Because of (x; y) 2 D(N f1g), it follows that K(p) = x. Next, because low(x; R) low(x; R 0 ) and Maskin monotonicity, we have that K(q) = x.
Combining Lemma's 1, 2, 3 and 4 yields the following corollaries. Corollary 2 If L N is a strategy-proof possibility domain, then ( D K (N f1g); L 1 ) is strategy-proof admissible.
Maximal domains for strategy-proofness
Corollary 2 characterizes strategy-proof possibility domains in terms of a set of pairs of alternatives on which the coalition of agents whose sets of preferences are not restricted are decisive. Consider a Pareto-e¢ cient, strategy-proof and non-dictatorial social choice rule K, such that for all strategy-proof possibility
So, L N is a maximal strategy-proof possibility domain. We shall prove in Theorem 2 that the conditions on D K (N f1g) under this maximality property yield that L 1 either has one inseparable pair or one inseparable set. Furthermore, we deduce that these separabilities are not only necessary but also su¢ cient. The following Lemmas are needed for the proof of Theorem 2. Intuitively it is reasonable that the smaller the set of decisive pairs of N f1g; the larger L 1 can be taken. The following Lemma shows that we may shrink the set of decisive pairs of N f1g. 
Then strategy(D ;
it follows that D is transitive. Let x; y; z 2 A, with #fx; y; zg = 3. Let (x; y) 2 D . Let y:::z:::x::: = R in L 1 . It is su¢ cient to prove that (z; y) 2 D and (x; z) 2 D . Because of strategy(D K (N f1g); L 1 ) and Lemma 5, it follows that (x; z); (z; y) 2 D K (N f1g). Moreover, by transitivity of D K (N f1g) and the de…nition of Y and Z, it follows that
The furthermore part follows by transitivity of D K (N f1g) and the de…nition of Y and Z.
Proof. In Lemma 6, we proved that there are disjoint Y and Z such that Also, by de…nition, Y is non-empty and because of x ; y 2 Y [ Z, with
It remains to prove that Y [ Z 6 = A. In order to do so, suppose that Y [ Z = A. We prove that we may take Z = ; and that Y 6 = A. Consider y 2 Y and R = y:: Proof. (Only-if-part) Suppose L 1 is a maximal strategy-proof possibility domain. By the previous Lemma there are disjoint subsets Y and Z of A such that 
Maximal domains for Maskin-monotonicity
In this section we characterize the maximal Maskin monotone possibility domains for the case that precisely one agent's set of preferences is restricted. Theorem 3 spells out a characterization of Maskin monotone possibility domains in terms of a set of pairs of alternatives on which the coalition of agents whom sets of preferences are not restricted are decisive. 
We have to prove the following implications for x; y; z 2 A and R; R 0 2 V . In order to prove (c) let X 1 and X 2 be a partition of Y [ Z with #X 1 > 2 and X 1 X 2 P . It is su¢ cient to prove that this contradicts the maximality of L N . Then
y and let R 0 2 L(A) be such that Rj A fxg = R 0 j A fxg and y::
which contradicts the maximality of L N . Next we prove (d).
First we prove L 1 V . Let R 2 L 1 . Then (1) follows because of the de…nition of P . In order to show that also (2) is satis…ed let z::
. Take x = best(Rj T ). So x 2 T and for some y 2 Y there are R 0 in L 1 with y:::z:::x::: 
1. if y::: = R for some y 2 Y 0 , then P 0 R; 2. if z::: = R for some z 2 Z 0 , then there are 
In order to prove Y 0 Y let y 2 Y 0 . To the contrary assume y = 2 Y . Then by the inclusion Y 0 [ Z 0 Y [ Z we may conclude that y 2 Z and that there are
. By the proof of the previous inclusion, we may assume that both
there are preferences R and R 0 in V such that cb::: = R and bc::
2 P 0 for all x 2 A fc; bg. Now, because R 0 2 W ,in view of condition 2 of W it follows that (c; b) 2 P 0 . Note that for all x 2 Y fb; cg, there are preferences R 00 = xbc::: in V W . So, because of (c; b) 2 P 0 , it follows that Y 0 = fcg. Since fc; bg Y , it follows that (c; b) is not an inseparable pair in V . Therefore, there are x 2 A fc; bg and preferences R 000 = cx::
. As Y 0 = fcg this yields x 2 Z 0 . Because of R 000 2 V and c 2 Y , it follows that (y; x) = 2 P for all y 2 A fc; xg. But then, there are preferences R 0000 = bcx::: in V W . Note that although b; x 2 Z 0 and (x; b) = 2 P 0 , there is no t 0 2 A (Y 0 [ Z 0 ) such that b:::t 0 :::x::: = R 0000 contradicting condition 2 of W . In consequence, Y = Y 0 .
In the following, we prove that 
So, Y = Y 0 and Z = Z 0 . Next we show that P = P 0 which then by the de…nition of V and W yields the desired result that V = W . First we show that P P 0 . To the contrary, suppose that (a; b) 2 P and (a; b) = 2 P 0 .
)) P \P 0 , it follows that a 2 Y [ Z and b 2 Z. Now because of the de…nition of V there are R 2 V with bat::: = R for some t 2 (A (Y [ Z) ). Since V W , this clearly yields a contradiction with condition 2 of W . So, P P 0 .
Next we prove P 0 P . Suppose (a; b) = 2 P . We prove that (a; b) = 2 P 0 . Because (a; b) = 2 P it follows by the de…nition of V that there are R 2 V such that both y::: = R for some y 2 Y and :::b:::a::: = R. As R 2 V W . This shows that (a; b) = 2 P 0 .
Conclusion
By restricting the domain of only one agent, we showed that it is possible to escape the negative conclusions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite and the Muller-Satterthwaite theorems. Obviously, the social choice functions we construct that are strategy-proof, Pareto-e¢ cient and non-dictatorial/ Maskin monotonic, Pareto-e¢ cient and non-dictatorial, indeed have a dictatorship ‡avor because of their hierarchical structures. 11 A question of interest would be to study how these social functions evolve as we restrict the preferences of more than one agent. We leave this question open for future research.
We close the discussion with two examples. The …rst one shows that there are domains which admit non-dictatorial, Pareto-e¢ cient and strongly positively associated choice rules but are not non-dictatorial, Pareto-e¢ cient and strategy-proof choice rules. Clearly K is non-dictatorial, Pareto-e¢ cient but not strategy-proof. Furthermore, K is strongly positively associated. To show this consider figdeviations p and q in L N such that p(i)j A fag = q(i)j A fag and low(a; p(i)) low(a; q(i)). It is su¢ cient to show that K(q) 2 fa; K(p)g. If i > 2; then K(p) = K(q). Let i = 2. If K(p) = 2 B, then K(p) = K(q). Let K(p) 2 B. Then fK(p); bg = fx; yg $ B for some b; x; y in A and xyt::: = p(1) and :::K(p):::b::: = p(2). If a 6 = b, then :::K(p):::b::: = q(1) and consequently K(q) = K(p). If b = a, then obviously K(q) 2 fK(p); ag. Let i = 1. Let K(p) = 2 B. If not a::: = q(1), then K(q) = K(p). If a::: = q(1), then aK(p)::: = q(1) and as K(p) = 2 B it follows that a = 2 B. So, in that case K(q) = a. Let K(p) 2 B. Then for some x; y; b 2 B we have fK(p); bg = fx; yg, xyt::: = p(1) and :::K(p):::b::: = p(2). If K(p) = a, then p(1) = q(1) or q(1) = yxt::: and K(p) = K(q). If a 6 = K(p) and not a::: = q(1), then K(p) = K(q). If a 6 = K(p) and a::: = q(1), then aK(p)bt::: = q(1). So, in that case a = 2 B and K(q) = a.
Our last example shows that if we restrict the sets of preferences of exactly two agents, then neither the condition of inseparable pair nor the condition of inseparable set is a necessary condition for the maximality of a strategy-proof possibility domain. ; (t; x)g else take K(p) = x. So at K agent 2 is decisive on the pairs (x; y) and (x; z); whereas agent 1 is decisive on the remaining pairs. So K is not dictatorial. As K(p) 2 fbest(p(1)); best(p(2))g we have that K is Pareto-e¢ cient. To see that K is strategy-proof consider pro…les p with p(2) = x:::. Then the outcome for any f1g-deviation of p is either x or z depending on whether agent 1 prefers x to z or z to x respectively. A similar reasoning holds for f2g-deviation of pro…le p with p(1) = y::: or p(1) = t:::. It is straight forward to see that for both agents i; the set L i does not have an inseparable pair or set. Therefore, we may conclude that these inseparabilities are not necessary conditions for maximal strategy-proof possibility domains in case the set of preferences of more than one agent is restricted. Note further that K is tops-only but that the sets L 1 and L 2 are neither convex nor connected.
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